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It  is  generally  recognized  that,  notwithstanding  their  distinct  histories  and  individual 
enforcement agencies, competition law and intellectual property law are not just compatible 
instruments of economic policy; they are complementary instruments. The two bodies of law 
pursue the common goal of economic efficiency. This does preclude a certain tension between 
them. To understand why, it is useful to briefly recall the more specific objectives of each 
body of law.  
The contemporary economist views competition policy as “the set of policies and laws 
which ensure that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in a way as to reduce 
economic welfare” (Motta, 2004, p. 30). This perception of the role of competition policy has 
not always been paramount in Europe. Integration towards a single market used to be a central 
objective of competition policy. Although the aforementioned present-day view of the role of 
competition policy has been in ascendancy at the Community level and in Member States 
after creation of the single market, European competition authorities still hold the view that 
national intellectual property rights hold back economic integration. 
According to Landes and Posner (2003, p. 1) intellectual property consists of “ideas, 
inventions, discoveries, symbols, images, expressive works, … or in short any potentially 
valuable  human  product  (broadly,  “information”)  that  has  an  existence  separable  from  a 
unique physical embodiment, whether or not the product has actually been “propertized”, that 
is  brought  under  a  legal  regime  of  property  rights”.  Therefore,  intellectual  property  laws 
represent the set of statutes, institutions and policies that grant, for a limited time, to authors 
and inventors exclusive rights over the expression of their writings and intellectual creations 
(copyrights) or over the ideas themselves embodied in their technical inventions (patents).  
To what extent is the existence of such exclusive rights compatible with competition? 
In this regard it is key to note an important difference between the European Union and the 
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United States (Korah, 2001). Unlike the US, the EU grants no intellectual property rights 
other than trademarks. Patents and copyrights are granted under the law of Member States, 
complemented by the so-called European patent, created by the European Patent Convention 
(1973)
2 currently signed by 28 contracting states. According to Articles 2 and 3, a European 
patent granted by virtue of this Convention and covering one or more of the contracting states 
shall have the effect of and be subject to the same conditions as a national patent granted by a 
contracting state. Therefore, a European patent is just a bundle of national patents granted by 
the European Patent Office (EPO). The EPO provides a one-stop shop that makes it possible 
to  get  around  the transaction  costs  associated  with  having  examinations  carried  out  in 
individual states. A patent granted by the EPO is recognized in a Member State if translated 
into the national language. A proposal for a Council Regulation on the Com munity Patent 
(O.J. 2000/C337 E/278) relying on the EPO, that would establish a single patent for the whole 
European Union, has not been adopted. Although cases are litigated before national courts, 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has given Community authorities a powerful instrument 
when it “drew a distinction between the grant or existence of a national intellectual property 
right, which was not subject to the Treaty, and its exercise, which was … The Court took 
power to override member states with respect to intellectual property rights that threatened to 
divide the common market along national boundaries” (Korah, 2001, 805).  
Initially, the European Community had an inimical perception of property rights. They 
were considered as impediments for the achievement of the common market. “The ECJ used 
the distinction between the existence and exercise of property rights in the early 1970s to 
develop a judicial doctrine of the Community exhaustion of intellectual property rights: once 
a protected product has been put on the market by the holder … or with it’s consent in one 
member state, the right was exhausted and a parallel intellectual property right could not be 
used to restrain the commercial importation of the product to another member state” (Korah, 
2001, 805). 
Things began to change in the 1980s (Encaoua et al. (2003), Martinez and Guellec, 
2003). The major role of intellectual property rights in stimulating innovation and growth 
gained  greater  recognition.  New  governing  bodies  have  emerged,  for  example  the  World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and the 
                                                 








































7  3 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in the US.
3 Moreover patent legislation has 
entered a harmonization process across countries via bilateral and multilateral treaties.
4  
From a competition policy perspective it also matters that over the same period there 
have been important changes in the motives that drive firms to obtain patents. A number of 
studies point to the fact that firms increasingly file applications covering technologies that are 
neither developed nor licensed.  In some high-tech industries, firms seek patents for strategic 
purposes, specifically, to exclude potential rivals (Carlton and Gertner, 2002, Cohen, Nelson 
and Walsh, 2000, Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). For example the US  semiconductor industry 
builds  patent  fences  around  core  inventions.  One  observes  a  proliferation  of  mutually 
blocking patents that coalesce into patent thickets that exclude potential rivals. This comes in 
addition to implicit threats of infringement suits that serve as bargaining chips to obtain 
access to other firms’ technologies or to force others to accept cross licensing arrangements 
(Shapiro, 2001, Encaoua and Hollander, 2002). 
These practices raise a host of issues at the interface of IP and competition policy
5. 
More specifically they may require a fresh exploration of areas where the grant of exclusive 
rights may shackle competitive market processes. Two forms of competition should be 
considered:  product  com petition  and  research  competition.  Product  competition  yields 
allocative efficiency and gives consumers the opportunity to obtain products at prices that are 
close to costs. Research competition produces new products and new technologies. It allows 
firms to escape the constraints of product competition, especially in  neck by net industries 
where firms have access to the same technologies and produce under the same costs  (Aghion 
et al. 1997, 2001, Encaoua and Ulph, 2000).    
However, market incentives may be  insufficient to produce the optimal amount of 
innovation. The standard modelling of competition   under a competitive process   does not 
account for important specificities. Not only the outcome of R&D is uncertain as everyone 
recognizes, but, more importantly, its output is an information good, i.e. it is non rivalrous and 
non excludable, except by legal means. Granting the original inventor an e xclusive right 
appears as an ex ante incentive to innovate, inasmuch as it encourages investment in research 
by avoiding free-riding. Note that it is the ex ante incentive that matters for the purpose of 
                                                 
3 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has nationwide jurisdiction and hears specialized cases like patent 
and international trade cases. See www.fedcir.gov 
4 The agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which has over 140 members 
goes beyond the requirement that protection applies to foreign inventors as to domestic ones by also specifying a 
minimum set of rights that each member state must provide (see Scotchmer, 2004,  chapter 11 “Innovation in the 
Global Economy”, 320)  








































7  4 
investment rather than the ex post reward to an inventor. The ex post reward approach that is 
prevalent  among  lawyers,  would  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  since  the  investment  cost  is 
already  sunk,  the  exercise  of  the  exclusive  right  has  to  be  strictly  scrutinized  under  the 
competition law. By contrast, an ex ante approach leads to the inverse conclusion that the 
successful  investor  shall  not  be  deprived  from  exclusive  right  to  commercialise  or  sell 
invention in order to keep the ex ante incentive to invest.     
Thus the grant of an exclusive right that limits competition in the product market is 
part and parcel of a trade-off. “Alike ordinary property rights that promote competition in 
production by preventing competition in consumption, intellectual property rights are a way 
(but not the only one) to promote innovation, by restricting some kinds of competition in 
production” (Vickers, 2001). Even so, later competition is encouraged because a patent is 
granted  on  condition  of  disclosure  of  the  knowledge  that  underpins  the  invention.  The 
disclosure favours the diffusion of know-how, allowing others to build around or improve on 
earlier inventions (Encaoua and Ulph, 2000). Protecting an innovation under secrecy does not 
allow  such  diffusion.  The  dissemination  of  knowledge  also  benefits  from  licensing 
agreements and other arrangements such as the pooling of patents
6. The latter also improve 
static efficiency because innovators are not always the best equipped to exploit existing know-
how.  
Today many economists and legal scholars “acknowledge that analysis and evaluation 
of intellectual property law are appropriately conducted within an economic framework that 
seeks  to  align  that  law  with  the  dictates  of  economic  efficiency  …  Cases,  doctrines  and 
principles  have  to  be  examined  from  the  standpoint  of  whether  they  are  efficient  in  an 
economic sense and, if not, how they might be changed to make them efficient” (Landes and 
Posner 2003, p. 4). 
Still, as soon as one trades in the bliss of pronouncing on fundamental objectives for 
the mundane pleasures of understanding the consequences of specific rules, it becomes plain 
that there exist areas of stress between the two bodies of law. The following sections show 
how European courts have managed these stresses in three areas: (1) Parallel imports and 
market  segmentation;  (2)  Refusals  to  supply  essential  inputs  protected  by  patents  and 
copyrights; (3) Forms of conduct by copyright collectives.  
                                                 
6 A patent pool is an agreement under which the owners of different technologies license them as a 
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1.  Parallel imports and competition 
 
Firms segment markets for efficiency reasons and in support of collusive agreements. It is 
also likely that they do so to gain a capacity to discriminate in terms of prices or qualities. 
Because intellectual property rights enhance right holders’ ability to segment markets, courts 
are constantly required to balance a desire to protect the holders of patents, copyrights and 
trademarks with a desire to give consumers access to products at competitive prices. From an 
economic perspective, the issue is not merely one of trading off dynamic and static efficiency. 
In addition the issue is how, in specific cases, segmentation affects static welfare. 
With  respect  to  international  segmentation,  there  are  specific  issues  related  to 
exhaustion  regimes  (explain  exhaustion  regimes  in  footnote)  and  the  legal  treatment  of 
parallel trade. Parallel trade takes place when products put into circulation in one country are 
exported to another country via distribution systems not set up, or consented to, by the party 
who put them on the market first. Parallel trade - also called grey trade - is not the same as 
trade in counterfeited goods
7. Products that circulate in parallel trade are genuine. They are 
generally marketed first by a person who holds the IPRs in these products, or by a licensee of 
such person. What sets parallel trade apart from ordinary commerce is the diversion of 
products from the markets ostensibly targeted by the (delete) IPR holders. 
Parallel trade responds to cross -country price disparities.
8  It limits the capacity of 
firms to segment national markets. This means that from an economic perspective, restrictions 
on parallel trade should be looked as devices that facilitate territorial segmentation.  
In the following, we start by recalling the incentives firms have to segment markets. 
Then we consider the view of the European institutions on the barriers to parallel trade; first 
imports from outside the Union, then trade among Member States.  
 
1.1. Market segmentation: some theory 
 
A  firm  with  market  power  can  increase  profits  by  segmenting  markets  and  engaging  in 
geographic price discrimination. However, there is no unambiguous answer to the question 
how this will affect overall welfare. Price discrimination brings about a welfare reducing 
misallocation of output across markets but total output may be larger than under uniform 
                                                 
7 "Grey trade" means that the products are neither black, i.e. counterfeited, nor white since they are sold against 
the will of at least one IPR holder. 
8 The price gaps may be due to differences in demand elasticity or to divergent pricing by regulators across 







































7  6 
pricing  -  possibly  because  additional  markets  are  being  served.  The  latter  is  welfare 
increasing.
9 Malueg and Schwartz (1994) have shown that when there  is a large disparity in 
the willingness to pay across national markets, a mixed regime of discrimination across 
groups of countries differentiated from each other by substantial differences in willingness to 
pay,  but not among countries within individual  groups yields greater world welfare than 
uniform pricing on a global scale.
10   
A capacity to discriminate may be necessary to insure that profits are positive. This 
applies mainly to industries where fixed costs are very large compared to variable cost. On e 
thinks  of  industries  that  rely  heavily  on  R&D  or  other  creative  effort.  The  argument 
essentially boils down to the claim that in certain industries, a mere right to exclude conferred 
by intellectual property law does not insure that returns are sufficien t to elicit a socially 
optimal level of innovation.  
In  this  regard  it  is  important  to  stress  that  economic  theory  does  not  give  an 
unequivocal answer to the question whether a switch from uniform to discriminatory pricing 
increases industry profits when firms confront rival producers. While it is true that each firm 
benefits from acquiring a capacity to discriminate, it loses when rival producers obtain the 
same capacity. The net effect on profits depends on the intensity of the rivalry. Allowing  
discrimination intensifies competition in market segments where buyers view the products of 
different producers as good substitutes, but, at the same time, it allows firms to capture larger 
profits in market segments that have a strong preference for their particular variety.
11  
It  is  not  always  the  desire  to  discriminate  that  steers  firms  towards  market 
segmentation. Manufacturers may grant distributors exclusive territories to encourage them to 
invest in promotional activities such as presale information, product a dvertising and quality 
control.  In  the  absence  of  exclusivity,  the  investment  by  one  distributor  benefits  rival 
distributors. Distributors that do not invest could attract customers who have already sought 
information from distributors who do invest, by un dercutting them. The very fact that their 
costs are lower gives them this option. The result is that each distributor has less incentive to 
invest  than  is  optimal  from  the  manufacturer’s  perspective.  To  address  this  problem  the 
                                                 
9  When  additional  markets  are  being  served,  consumers  in  these  countries  will  benefit  and  consumers  in 
countries that would have been served under uniform prices need not lose. 
10 Adoption of such policies would, however,  run afoul of importers’ most favoured nation obligations under 
WTO rules. WTO membership does limit (allow?) a country’s freedom to choose its policy with respect to 
parallel trade. However, it requires the country to abide by the most favoured nation rule regardless of the policy 
it chooses.  







































7  7 
manufacturer may take measures that reduce the likelihood that buyers in a territory allocated 
to one distributor would be served by distributors in another territory.   
While  the  alignment  of  distributors’  and  manufacturers’  incentives  is  likely  to  be 
welfare  enhancing,  it  could  come  at  a  cost.  For  example,  the  elimination  of  downstream 
competition can lead to double marginalization.
12 This reduces manufacturers’ profits and 
consumers'  welfare.  It  also  reduces  interbrand  competition.  Rey  and  Stiglitz  (1995)  have 
shown that the latter is due to the fact that distributors with market power do not fully pass on 
to their buyers increases in the wholesale price. Therefore the demand faced by manufacturers 
is  less  elastic  than  it  would  be  if  distributors  were  in  competition.  The  outcome  of  the 
reduction in elasticity can mirror collusion
13.  
Manufacturers adopt a variety of measures to curtail grey trade and enhance their 
capacity to profit from price discrimination. They sometimes put quotas on the quantities 
delivered in a national territory.
14 At other times they limit the coverage of guarantees to the 
territory where the product was first put into circulation. Every so often, they use technical 
means that preclude use in one country of an article originally sold in another territory.
15 At 
times, they try to create in the mind of consumers residing in high price countries, the belief 
that grey goods are counterfeit, pirated, (omit comma) or of lesser quality.
16   
The  laws  that  protect  intellectual  property  provide  another  avenue  for  the 
segmentation of national markets. A central issue concerning intellectual property protection 
is which rights are relinquished upon the first legal sale of a product in which rights are 
initially held. Consider, for example the case of CDs containing music. Composers, publishers 
and, possibly, makers and performers hold initial rights in the music as well as in the CD that 
contains the music. However, upon first sale of the CD they lose the right to prohibit its 
                                                 
12 That is both the manufacturer and the distributor set price above marginal cost. 
13 Gallini and Hollis (1999) give a detailed overview of the pros and cons of market segmentation, focussing on 
the restrictions on parallel imports achieved via trademark protection.  
14 See Crampes, Hollander and Macdissi (2004). 
1515 For example, the international distribution of films on DVD has been technologically and legally segmented 
into geographical markets. The regional coding system requires that all DVD players be manufactured for 
distribution and use in one of six geographic regions around the world. It is a global initiative by agent s of the 
film and DVD industries aimed at preventing the free movement of licensed copies of copyright DVDs around 
the world. Dunt, Gans, and King (2001) have studied whether the restrictions on DVD usage across regions can 
be justified as a means of generating potentially socially desirable price discrimination for content providers or 
are simply a means of restricting competition. They conclude that  "the conditions that may theoretically allow 
such restrictions to be efficient are unlikely to hold in the  case of DVDs and that social welfare is likely to be 
significantly enhanced by eliminating such technical restrictions." (not italic, add page ref.)  Their argument is 
that  among  the  four  potential  consequences  of  such  restrictions  on  regional  flows  (price  discrimination, 
collusion, free-riding, and the prevention of consumer confusion), the latter two  -potentially socially desirable- 
consequences are unlikely to be important.  
16 However, in some instances a moderate amount of parallel imports may actually b enefit a manufacturer. See 







































7  8 
resale. That right has been exhausted.
17 In the discussion below, exhaustion of a right will 
always refer to the loss of the right to control reselling.    
IPRs are territorial. The right to control a particular use of protected material applies 
only within the national boundaries of the jurisdiction that gra nts that right. This applies 
equally to the exhaustion of rights , i.e., (omit commas) the national law determines under 
what circumstances a right holder – resident or foreigner – exhausts the right to control resale 
in the national territory.  
There  are  several  exhaustion  regimes.  Under  a  regime  of  national  exhaustion,  the 
person holding the IPRs (delete s) in a product waives the right to prohibit resale of that 
product  in  the  national  territory  upon  the  first  legal  sale  within  the  boundaries  of  that 
territory.
18 In countries that accept international exhaustion, the original right holder forfeits 
the power to control resale within the (delete the) national boundaries as soon as the product 
is legally put into circulation anywhere in the world.  
The particular regime a country chooses may vary from one type of IPR to another. 
For example, a country may adopt international exhaustion in the case of trademarks and 
national exhaustion for patents. Furthermore, regimes may occasionally be product -specific. 
The  exhaustion  regime  a  country  chooses  always  reflects  a  somewhat  uneasy  balance 
between, on one hand, a desire to protect the interest of IPR s (delete s) holders, and on the 
other hand, the wish to guarantee consumers and businesses the opportunity to make informed 
purchases in a competitive environment. 
In the following, we discuss the approach of the European Union towards parallel 
imports from a perspective of competition policy. The EU makes a distinction between 
parallel trade between Member States and tr ade between the Union and non -members. The 
most important difference between the EU and other jurisdictions is the adoption  by the 
former (delete) of a regime of regional exhaustion under the  Trade Marks Harmonization 
Directive.
19  Article  7  of  the  Directive  prescribes  a  regime  under  which  the  owner  of  a 
                                                 
17 Some of these rights holders can still prohibit certain uses of the CD. For example, they can forbid the CD’s 
performance on radio or in any public place. The reason is that the right to perform in public the music fixed on 
the CD is not exhausted upon the first sale of the CD. 
18 This assumes that the goods have not been altered after they have been put on the market by the owner of the 
trade mark or with his consent. Repackaging is not per se forbidden; see Commission Communication on 
parallel imports of proprietary medicinal products – frequently asked questions, MEMO/04/7, Brussels, 19th 
January 2004. 
19 The Directive was adopted in 1989 (89/104 (EEC) 21 December 1988) but became effective  only in 1996. “A 
trade  mark  may  consist  of  any  sign  capable  of  being  represented  graphically,  particularly  words,  including 
personal names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their packaging, provided that such signs are 







































7  9 
trademark cannot avail himself of the right conferred by trademark law to prevent the sale 
anywhere in the EU of a good marketed first by him or with his consent in any territory of the 
European  Economic  Area.  This,  however,  ceases  to  apply  when  the  proprietor  of  the 
trademark has legitimate reasons to oppose further commercialization, especially when the 
condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the market. Trade 




1.2. Grey goods originating outside the EEA  
 
The conditions under which exhaustion of right conferred by trade marks occurs have been 
clarified in several decisions rendered by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  
In the Silhouette case, the ECJ ruled that a Member State could not adopt a wider 
exhaustion regime than set out in Article 7 of the Trade Mark Directive. This was founded in 
part on the wording of the Directive, and on the observation that “if some members practiced 
international exhaustion and others did not there would be barriers to trade, and this would 
affect the functioning of the internal market, and this is precisely the objective pursued by the 
Directive”.
21  
The notion of consent received further (delete) elucidation in the subsequent (delete) 
Sebago  judgment  in  which  the  ECJ  rejected  the  validity  of  an  importer’s  claim  that  the 
trademark holder exhausted his right to prevent the sale within the EU of all batches of a good 
once he had consented to the marketing of a single batch of identical goods.
22   
                                                                                                                                                         
The objective of a trade mark is to help buyers to identify the source of products. This gives producers the 
incentive to improve quality. 
20 Before the Directive went into effect, most EU countries operated under international exhaustion. A concise 
review of the history of the Directive appears in Trogh (2002). Although the exhaustion regime is mainly applied 
to trademarks, it also concerns the topography of semicondu ctors (article 5(5) of Directive 87/54/EEC), patents 
(art. 28 of Agreement 89/695/EEC), biological inventions (article 10 of Directive 98/44/EC) and designs (article 
15 of Directive 98/71/EC). The European Court of Justice applied the principle to copyrigh ts (Cases 55/80 and 
57/80  Musik-Vertrieb  Membran  GmbH  and  KKK-Tel  International  v.  GEMA  )  and  to  patents  (Case  15/74 
Centrafarm v. Sterling Drugs). Our focus here is on the competition issues raised by the protection afforded by 
trade marks. 
21 Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, paragraph 41 cited by Trogh (2002) page 29 (delete). The case involved 
the attempt by the Austrian owner of the Silhouette trademark to prohibit the importation into Austria of a type 
of genuine Silhouette sunglasses legally marketed in Bulgaria but no longer sold in Austria. Prior to accession to 
the EU, (delete comma) Austria operated under a regime of international exhaustion. Having failed in its action 
for trademark infringement before the lower courts, Silhouette appealed to th e Supreme Court of Austria which 
submitted a reference to the European Court of Justice.  The ECJ, therefore, overturned the decision in the 
Austrian courts. 
22 The case involved a suit brought by the owner of the Sebago trademark against a Belgian firm that  imported 
shoes from the Salvadorian manufacturer of the genuine product for resale under the original label. The claimant 
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The meaning of consent was also at the heart of the later Davidoff and Levis cases (C-
414/99  to  C-416/99).  The  ECJ  held  that  consent  cannot  be  inferred  from  the  absence  of 
contractual provisions or communication to that effect, or from the fact that the goods carry 
no warning that sale outside a specific area is prohibited. The ECJ held that consent requires 
an unequivocal demonstration of renunciation of one’s right to oppose importation into the 
EEA.  
While the aforementioned decisions bear on the question whether trade mark law can 
be used for blocking parallel imports into the Union, they do not address the question whether 
contractual provisions between private undertakings that commit one party to sell only in 
assigned territories outside the EU are prohibited. This question was addressed by the ECJ in 
response to a question raised by a French court. The case involved proceedings brought by 
Yves St Laurent Parfums (YSLP) against Javico. The perfume manufacturer had entered into 
a contract for the distribution of its products in selected territories outside  the EEA. The 
contract provided that the distributor would not sell the product outside these territories or to 
unauthorized dealers in the territory. When YSLP discovered that products sold to Javico 
were marketed in several countries of the Community, it broke the contract and started legal 
proceedings. When a French court upheld both termination of the contract and its claim for 
compensation,  the  defendant  appealed  on  the  ground  that  the  controversial  contractual 
provision was prohibited by Article 85(1) (now 81(1)) and therefore automatically void.  
The  ECJ  ruled  that  in  order  to  determine  whether  agreements  such  as  the  one 
concluded between YSLP and Javico run afoul of Article 85(1), one must consider whether 
their purpose or effect is to restrict to “an appreciable extent competition within the common 
market and whether the ban may affect trade between Member States”.
23 The Court held that 
agreements could not be struck down unless they were capable of affecting trade between 
Member States. The ruling it handed down was that the provisions at issue “did not constitute 
agreements which, by their very nature, are prohibited by Article 85(1)” (paragraph 21 of the 
judgment). It remained for the national court to determine whether they did in fact have such 
effect.
24  
                                                 
23 Case C-306/96, Javico International and Javoco AG v. Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA, 28 April 1998. 
24  The Court said that a violation may take place “where the Community market in the products in question is 
characterized by an oligopolistic structure or by an appreciable difference between the prices charged for the 
contractual product within the Community and those charged outside the Community  and where, in view of the 
production and sales in the Member States, the prohibition entails a risk that it might have an appreciable effect 
on the pattern of trade between Member States such as to undermine attainment of the objectives of the common 







































7  11 
The  significance  of  the  Javico  ruling  may  be  rather  limited  in  view  of  the  ECJ’s 
decision in Davidoff and Levis. A possible consequence of the latter is that firms concerned 
about the importation of their trademarked products into the EU will find such prohibitions as 
imposed on Javico redundant.
25 This would be true all the more if it was det ermined that 
international exhaustion applies in circumstances where contractual measures designed to 
prevent importation into the EU contravene Article 81 or Article 82.  
 
1.3. Partitioning of the EU into national markets 
 
The stance of competition authorities with respect to territorial restrictions that restrain grey 
trade within the Community appears less flexible. The courts have held that an agreement 
whose object it is to prevent grey trade within the Community is by its very nature a violation 
of Article 81(1).
26 This means that in order to find a breach of Article 81(1) it is sufficient to 
show: i) that the measures taken amount to an agreement; and ii) that the object of the 
agreement  is  to  prevent  parallel  trade  within  the  Community.  The  following  decisions 
illustrate the point.  
Yamaha
27 sold instruments through a network of official dealers located in various EU 
countries. It signed contracts with its dealers that bound the latter to the following: 1) sell 
solely to final customers; 2) buy solely from Yamaha’s national subsidiary; 3) supply solely 
distributors authorized by the national subsidiary, and 4) contact Yamaha Europe in Germany, 
before exportation via the Internet.(close gap)
28 In addition, the guarantees issued by Yamaha 
were in effect onl y in the country of original purchase of the instrument they covered.
29 
Furthermore, the contract between Yamaha and its Icelandic dealer contained an explicit 
prohibition of parallel trade.  
The Commission concluded that commitments to sell exclusively to  final consumers, 
buy solely from Yamaha’s national subsidiary and supply solely distributors authorized by the 
national  subsidiary  had  the  object  of  preventing  cross-supplies  within  Yamaha’s  dealer 
                                                 
25 Unless such provisions allowed the owner of the trade mark to claim damages for infringement that would 
otherwise not be awarded. 
26 For example, in the (delete) Case IV/35.733 – VW, “(t)he obstruction of parallel exports of vehicles by final 
consumers  and  of  cross-deliveries  within  the  dealer  network  hampers  the  objective  of  the  creation  of  the 
common market, a principle of the Treaty, and is already for that reason to be classified as a particularly serious 
infringement.” 
27 Commission Decision of 16.07.2003, Case COMP/37.975 PO/Yamaha. 
28 The details of the contractual provision differed to some extent from one country to another but their essence 
was very similar. 







































7  12 
network.
30  It  reached  this  conclusion  by  examining  the  poss ible  consequences  of  the 
aforementioned provisions. The Commission also argued that "although the object of the 
agreement (to contact Yamaha before exporting) may not have been to directly restrict 
exports, it clearly had the potential effect of discouraging dealers from exporting products to 
other Member States." (Paragraph 109 of the decision). Interestingly, the Commission did not 
even broach the question of object or effect in regard to the Icelandic contract. It simply 
invoked the ruling without considering Yamaha’s claim that, given Iceland’s remote location, 
it was unlikely that the contractual clause would in fact restrict trade.
31  
The question which kind of conduct is required to create an agreement within the 
meaning of Article 81 was at the heart of the subsequent Bayer case. The local distributors of 
the pharmaceutical firm had signed contracts that included provisions that were designed to 
eliminate grey trade among Member States. The European Commission held that there existed 
an agreement between Bayer and its dealers and fined Bayer (by how much?) (96/478/EC). Its 
finding was based on the observation that the dealers had continued their business relationship 
with Bayer, and, in response to the contract, had adapted the way they placed orders. T he 
Commission noted but did not discuss the implications of the fact that in response to Bayer’s 
measures the wholesalers put together their orders as if the product they received would serve 
to meet only the demand of their national market, and that they did their best to inflate the 
national quotas imposed on them by Bayer. The evidence examined by the Commission also 
showed that wholesalers tried to get additional quantities by ordering from other, generally 
smaller, wholesalers who were not monitored by Bayer.  
The  Court  of  First  Instance  (CFI)  overturned  the  Commission’s  decision.  (2001/C 
95/13).  It  held  that  the  Commission  had  erred  by  considering  that  it  had  established  the 
existence of a concurrence of wills between Bayer and the dealers. And, the mere absence of 
such concurrence meant that there was no agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1).
32 
The CFI argued that the Commission was wrong in concluding that the reduction in orders 
could only be understood by Bayer as a sign that dealers had accepted its demands. The 
                                                 
30 It also noted that under settled case law there is no need for the purpose of application of Article 81(1), to 
show an actual anti-competitive effect of agreed conduct whose object it is to restrict competition within the 
Common Market. 
31 The Javico ruling mentioned in section 1.2 states that “an agreement which requires a reseller not to resell 
products outside the contractual territory has as its object the exclusion of parallel imports within the Community 
and  consequently  restriction  of  competition  in  the  common  market  ...  Such  provisions,  in  contracts  for  the 
distribution  of  products  within  the  Community,  therefore  constitute  by  their  very  nature  a  restriction  of 
competition." C-306/96, paragraph 14. 
32 Remind that establishing the existence of a potentially anticompetitive agreement relieves the Commission of 
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Commission could not maintain that the reason wholesalers had to order additional quantities 
from other dealers was because they agreed to Bayer’s demands. The CFI opined that these 
orders  were  not  indicative  of  the  fact  (delete)  that  wholesalers  did  acquiesce.
33  It  also 
explained why Bayer’s behavior justified a decision at variance with the earlier Sandoz ruling 
in which it had determined that an agreement existed.
34 Sandoz had on repeated occasions 
indicated on the bills sent to its clients that export of the goods was prohibited. The fact that 
its distributors had continued to order without protest and had de facto respected the ban 
meant that they had tacitly acquiesced to Sandoz’ terms. However, whereas Sandoz had put a 
specific anticompetitive clause in the contract, a formal prohibition to export was lacking in 
Bayer.  Furthermore,  Bayer  had  not  implemented  a  systematic  monitoring  of  the  final 
destination of the product and there was no evidence that the manufacturer had threatened or 
punished  a  wholesaler  who  exported,  or  made  the  delivery  of  product  conditional  on 
wholesalers’ compliance with the alleged export ban.  
The ECJ upheld the CFI's judgment. (C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P delivered on 6 January 
2004). It indicated that while existence of a monitoring system and penalties may amount to 
an indicator of an agreement, they do not prove its existence. The Court emphasized that the 
mere fact that Bayer imposed a quota that may have had the same effect as an export ban, 
does not imply it had imposed a ban, or that there existed an agreement. The Court stressed 
that the concurrent existence of an agreement that is neutral from a competition standpoint 
and a measure restrictive of competition that is imposed unilaterally does not amount to a 
violation of Article 81(1). Because there had been no claim that Bayer was dominant, the need 
to examine whether Article 82 had been violated did not arise. 
The decision in Bayer does not fully answer the question whether unilateral behavior 
by  a  dominant  actor  designed  to  rein  in  parallel  trade  would  be  treated  by  competition 
authorities in the same way as other potentially abusive forms of conduct.
35 The answer to this 
question  ultimately  depends  on  how  competition  authorities  and  the  courts  view 
discriminatory practices, in particular price discrimination. It appears that exemptions to the 
prohibition of price-discrimination by competition authorities are rare (reference for this?). 
This is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that there is no basis in theory for a claim that 
                                                 
33 This begs the question whether some forms of cheating on a mundane price-fixing cartel could similarly 
protect a participant from being accused of tacit collusion.    
34 Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici/Commission ( C-277/87, rec. P.I-45) 
35 After all, restrictions of parallel trade go against a fundamental objective of the Treaty of Rome which is 
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discrimination is more harmful to the competitive process than the other forms of conduct 
mentioned in Article 82. 
As indicated at the beginning of the section, the economic literature points to several 
circumstances under which price discrimination yields higher welfare than uniform pricing. 
Even from a consumer welfare point of view one cannot argue that discrimination always 
lacks redeeming value. Furthermore, the empirical evidence on the price effects of parallel 
trade  within  the  European  Union  remains  sparse.  Some  analysis  suggests  that  the  rents 
captured by parallel traders exceed the benefits to consumers in countries that import via 
parallel channels and consumer gains are small or moderate.
36 This and the fact that parallel 
trade consumes resources would suggest that grey products may affect welfare adversely or 
not at all. One must admit, however, that at this stage it is not clear yet (delete) whether some 
of the(delete) assumptions underlying the conclusion that consumers in the EU draw little 
benefit from parallel trade, are critical to that finding.
37 
 
2.  Refusals to supply an essential intellectual property right  
 
Rights of exclusion differ according to category of IP. A patent owner can prevent others 
from making, using or selling the patented invention for a period of 20 years from the date of 
issue  of  the  patent.  Copyright  protection  which  applies  to  original  works  of  authorship 
embodied in a tangible medium of expression normally expires in the European Union 70 
years after the death of the author. Unlike a patent, a copyright protects only the form of 
expression. It does not protect the underlying idea. This means that a right holder in a work 
“a” holds no rights in an independently created work “b” based on a similar idea. Trade 
secrecy protection applies to information whose commercial value depends on non disclosure. 
Of course, trade secrets have no expiry date and they do not provide a legal barrier that stops 
others from independently producing and using the same invention. 
From  an  intellectual  property  perspective,  one’s  right  to  exclude  others  is  key. 
Competition authorities do of course recognize the right to exclude since it is granted under 
                                                 
36 See Ganslandt and Maskus (1999) and NERA (1999). 
37 Nevertheless European Competition authorities seem to take a particularly dim view of restrictions designed to 
prevent  arbitrage.  In  the  words  of  the  Director  General  of  DG  Competition  at  the  Commission  "…  sales 
restrictions may be used to prevent arbitrage and support price discrimination between different markets. This 
will in general lead to a loss of consumer welfare. While some consumers will pay a higher price and others will 
pay a lower price, collectively consumers will have to pay more to finance the extra profits obtained by the 
supplier and to cover the extra costs of supporting the price discrimination scheme. Therefore consumer welfare 
will in general decline unless it can be clearly shown that otherwise the lower priced market(s) would not be 
served at all and that therefore the price discrimination will lead to an undisputable increase of output. It's only in 
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patent  and  copyright  laws.  Their  concern  arises  when  that  right  protects  an  input  that  is 
indispensable to another party. They may consider that a refusal to licence an essential input 
is  abusive  when  it  prevents  competition.  This  creates  a  potential  for  friction  between 
intellectual property law and competition law.  
According to the essential facilities doctrine a firm holding a dominant position in the 
provision of an input that is indispensable for the production of another good that competes 
with  the  good  in  which  the  firm  is  dominant,  acts  abusively  when,  without  objective 
justification, it refuses to supply the input. The application of this doctrine must obey  to 
stringent conditions:  i) the facility must be under the control of  a dominant firm; ii) the 
access to the facility is unavoidable to allow a competitor operate in a downward market; iii) 
it is practically impossible to duplicate the facility; iv) the access to the facility by competitors 
is technically feasible under standard safety rules; v) the plaintiff is willing to accept the 
standard commercial terms and vi) the refusal to supply access to the facility has no objective 
reason. Despite the severity of these requirements, it seems that competition authorities in 
different countries have often be too ready to apply the essential facilities doctrine, mainly in 
the case of natural monopolies such as utilities and transportation services
38.  
The application of this doctrine is  much more difficult when the so called essential 
input is related to an intangible asset. In principle, firms that produce patented or copyrighted 
information goods  and wield substantial monopoly power are not shielded   from antitrust 
liability. However, it is only in exceptional circumstances that courts in the EU and the US , 
have invoked the doctrine.  This raises the difficult question of whether licensing should be 
made compulsory in some circumstances.  
 
2.1 The economics of compulsory licensing 
 
Gilbert and Shapiro (1996) argue that conditions such as the ones listed above cannot 
by themselves justify compulsory licensing on economic grounds: “These conditions do not 
characterize the circumstances under which compulsory access to a facility or to intellectual 
property would be beneficial to economic welfare. A firm may choose to deny access to an 
actual or potential competitor … for many different reasons. These include reasons that are 
likely to enhance economic efficiency”. Preventing free riding that would diminish incentives 
for investment and innovation, preserving a desired level of service quality and designing 
appropriate contracts that compensate the intellectual property owner for the loss of revenue 
                                                 
38  A  useful  introduction  to  the  essential  facility  doctrine  can  be  found  in  Temple  Lang  (2000).  Different 
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that may result from access may justify the refusal to deal. Still one cannot dismiss a pure 
strategic motive behind a refusal to license. Therefore, a detailed inquiry on a case by case 
basis is needed to analyze the consequences of a refusal to license an essential intellectual 
property  right.  The  inquiry  must  take  into  account  the  economic  conditions  under  which 
welfare would be diminished if access to the facility was denied (Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 
Gilbert, 2000, 2002, 2004, Scotchmer, 2004, Maurer and Scotchmer, 2004).  
On economic grounds, the short run effects of a refusal to license depend on how the 
price of the license is determined. Under a fixed fee regime, if the competitor had access to 
the IPR, its decisions would not be affected by the value of the fee. The fixed-fee license does 
not change the market outcome and its effect is purely distributive. But even in this case, the 
effect on welfare of an order to license depends on the licensee’s efficiency. If the licensee is 
not very efficient or at least less efficient than the patent’s holder when using its proprietary 
technology, an order to license is detrimental to economic welfare. However, there are also 
situations where licenses to efficient competitors could be optimal but are not voluntary. It is 
in these situations that compulsory licensing is welfare improving in the short run.  
Under  a  royalty  regime  with  royalties  linear  on  units  supplied,  the  outcome  may 
depend on whether the patent holder does produce or not himself. If the patent holder does not 
produce, linear royalties combined to fixed fees are sufficient to support the profit maximum 
(Scotchmer, 2004, 187-189). In this case licensing is based on private incentives and there 
may be no scope for compulsory licensing. But when the patent holder is also a producer, the 
situation  is  different  since  a  linear  royalty  leads  to  an  inefficient  outcome,  except  if  the 
licensee is more efficient than the patent holder. One solution to this problem could be either 
to impose a royalty rate that is a decreasing function of the licensor’s output or to cap the 
licensor’s output by imposing a maximal bound (Maurer and Scotchmer, 2004).     
Since  the  proponents  of  compulsory  licensing  only  require  that  the  royalty  be 
reasonable and do not propose a certain payment formula, it is difficult to assess the short run 
consequences of a compulsory license for economic efficiency.  
An obligation to license also affects long run incentives to invest in R&D. Consider 
the case where investment in R&D is represented by a bid for an innovation produced by an 
upstream laboratory. Gilbert and Shapiro (1996) identify two adverse effects of compulsory 
licensing. “First, a compulsory license reduces the profits of the winning bidder by forcing the 
winner to license in situations where it is not privately rational to do so. Second, compulsory 
licensing is likely to lower the value of the winning bid because it increases the profits of the 







































7  17 
from  the  innovation,  assuming  the  owner  of  the  technology  is  compelled  to  license  the 
technology at a price that the licensee would be willing to pay. The size of the winning bid is 
determined by a firm’s value of owning the technology, less the value to the firm if the 
technology is in the hands of its rival. Compulsory licensing lowers the first component and 
raises the second. Thus, compulsory licensing can have two negative effects on economic 
welfare. It can reduce welfare in the short run by compelling inefficient licensing. It can also 
reduce welfare in the long run by reducing incentives for innovation.” 
 
2.2 Decisions of European courts 
  
To illustrate these difficulties, we discuss a number of competition cases that address 
refusals to license essential inputs protected as intellectual property. Some major decisions 
clarify  under  what  circumstances  European  competition  authorities  consider  that  a  right 





40 cases.  
   
The facts of two cases are similar. Renault and Volvo had design rights on their models for 
car body panels. They denied access to their design rights to independent repairers, preventing 
them from supplying spare parts. The ECJ did not set out the circumstances in which a refusal 
to sell is abusive. It did, however, provide examples of abusive conduct, pointing out that the 
latter  can  result  from  the  exercise  of  intellectual  property  rights.  They  include:  (a)  the 
arbitrary refusal to supply; (b) fixing prices at an unfair level; (c) ending the production of 
spare parts for models still in circulation. The ECJ ruled that the freedom of an IP owner is the 
core subject matter of the exclusive right and that the refusal in itself could not be an abuse of 
dominant position under Article 82. Refusal to license could be an abuse only if there was 
additional abusive conducts of the types reported above.  So the ECJ did not condemn the 
defendants.   
    
Magill
41 
In the Magill decision, the ECJ set out for the first time circumstances a refusal to license can 
be said to constitute an abuse of dominance
42. They include (a) preventing the emergence of a 
                                                 
39 Case C-53/87, ECR 6039, 1988 
40 Case C-238/87, ECR 6211, 1989 
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new product for which there is a potential demand; (b) a non-justified refusal to license; and 
(c) the monopolization by the right’s holder of a secondary market by exploiting power in a 
primary market. 
The  facts  of  this  case  are  as  follows:  Three  Irish  TV  broadcasting  stations  held 
copyrights on their individual program listings. Each station published its own TV guide to 
inform viewers of its program for the following week. Each station also granted a license to 
daily papers to publish its list of programs one day in advance and the license was granted 
free of charge. When Magill decided to publish an all-inclusive weekly guide for all three 
stations, they sued for copyright infringement and got a preliminary injunction. The stations 
subsequently refused to grant licenses to Magill and the company filed a complaint with the 
European Commission. The Commission concluded that refusal was in breach of Article 82. It 
ordered the stations to put an end to their abusive conduct by supplying "third parties on 
request and on a non-discriminatory basis with their individual advance weekly programme 
listings and permitting reproduction of those listings by such parties" (89/205/EEC). 
This decision was upheld on appeal by the CFI and the ECJ. In a famous decision the 
highest court said that, although the right to exclude is the substance of the exclusive right, the 
refusal to license in the special circumstances listed above violates the general obligation of 
dominant  firms  to  supply  a  downstream  competitor.  The  ECJ  held  that  although  “mere 
ownership of an intellectual property right cannot confer a dominant position”, there was a de 
facto monopoly over the information produced by the TV stations since they were the only 
source. The refusal to supply a license was preventing the emergence of a new product for 
which there was apparently a market demand; and finally there was no justified reason the 
refusal. The refusal to license judged under the heading of the essential facilities doctrine. The 
Court did not address the question whether one’s obligation to license should in some ways be 
affected by the economic value of the asset protected under intellectual property law. The 
social benefit of the right to prohibit publication of a TV guide is hardly obvious. Neither the 
inspiration behind an artistic creation nor the perspiration behind a research effort is present: 
there was no significant sunk cost to justify an IP protection. The economic rationale may be 
that the public wants to be confident that the published programes are reliable. This, however, 
does not explain why the holder should be granted exclusivity, except if there is a risk of error 
in the competitors' publications.  
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Much of the litigation to the refusal to license would not take place if intellectual 
property  rights  were  granted  on  more  solid  grounds.  The  proliferation  of  IPRs,  many  of 
dubious background, exacerbates problems at the interface of Intellectual Property law and 
competition  policy.  It  would  be  useful  to  assign  a  screening  function  to  the  intellectual 
property system by sorting out inventions that would be undertaken without any intellectual 
protection from those that would not. Without such selection, frivolous intellectual property 
rights  will  most  likely  proliferate  without  adding  a  real  social  benefit  and  provoking 
expensive  litigation.  This  is  not  to  say  that  is  not  socially  valuable,  but  since  is  clearly 





The association that organizes horse races in France holds the copyright on the sounds and 
pictures of races. It refused to grant Tiercé Ladbroke - a Belgian bookmaker - a license to 
rebroadcast French horse races live. The Commission rejected a complaint by Ladbroke and 
the CFI rejected an attempt by Ladbroke to invoke Magill. The CFI limited the obligations of 
a dominant actor under Magill by holding that there was no duty to license live of French 
horse races to a firm that was already the leading provider of betting services in Belgium. But, 
it also made explicit the obligation of a producer to provide access to an indispensable input. 





45    
Although it does not deal directly with intellectual property, the Oscar Bronner case has much 
in  common  with  the  previous  cases.  Mediaprint,  an  Austrian  newspaper  publisher  and 
distributor, refused to distribute the daily newspaper of Oscar Bronner - a small publisher - 
through its national home-delivery network. Bronner complained to an Austrian court that, as 
a small publisher, it could not invest in another distribution network next to that of Mediaprint 
who was dominating the distribution service. Mediaprint argued that it was not required to 
help a competitor. The Austrian court referred to the ECJ the question whether the refusal by 
                                                 
43 Case T-504/93, 1997, ECR II-923 
44 "The refusal to supply the applicant could not fall within the prohibition laid down by Article 86 (now 82) 
unless it concerned a product or service which was either essential for the exercise of the activity in question, in 
that there was no real or potential substitute, or was a new product whose introduction might be prevented, 
despite specific, constant and regular potential demand on the part of consumers "(CFI, Case T-504/93, par. 
131). 
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a group holding a substantial share of the market in daily newspapers to allow the publisher of 
a  competing  newspaper  access  to  its  home-delivery  network  constituted  an  abuse  of  a 
dominant position. The Court argued that refusal would not constitute an abuse if there were 
alternatives  to  home  delivery  or  if  it  was  not  impossible  to  develop  a  competing  home 
delivery system.  Considering that the plaintiff had not shown that it would be uneconomical 
for competitors to set up a second system, the Court ruled that there was no breach.   
The ECJ decision has contributed to a better understanding of the doctrine. “Advocate 
General Jacobs used very general language in narrowing the obligation of a dominant firm to 
grant access. He observed that the ECJ has not used the term “essential facility” in this case 
law, but has held in many cases that for a dominant firm to cut off supplies to an existing 
consumer amounts to an abuse” (Korah, 2001, 815). Most importantly, the Advocate General 
stressed that in assessing the balance between the need to keep incentives to creation of the 
facility and the need to protect competition “particular care is required where the goods or 
services or facilities to which access is demanded represent the fruit of substantial investment. 
That may be true in particular in relation to refusal to license intellectual property rights. Such 
exclusive rights are granted for a limited period that in itself involves a balancing of the 
interests in free competition with that of providing an incentive for research and development 
and for creativity. It is therefore for good reason that the Court has held that the refusal to 





IMS supplies reports on the regional sales of pharmaceutical products in different countries 
including  Germany.  In  order  to  respect  confidentiality  pharmacies  are  grouped  by  zones  
called bricks or modules. IMS has created a protected (copyright on a data base) structure of 
1860 modules in Germany. In 1999, National Data Corporation (NDC) and Azyx entered the 
German market by creating a structure that was compatible with that of IMS. IMS sued for 
infringement  and  won.  When  IMS  refused  to  issue  a  license  to  NDC,  the  latter  filed  a 
complaint that this constituted an abuse of dominant position. The Commission compelled 
IMS to grant a license to undertakings already present in the market. However, the order was 
suspended  on  appeal  by  the  CFI.  This  suspension  was  later  upheld  by  the  ECJ.  The 
Commission has now withdrawn its decision. 
                                                 
46 Advocate General Jacob’s opinion in C7/97, 1998 I/7817, §61 
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The case contrasts the views of the Commission and those of CFI and ECJ (Derclaye, 
2003). The Commission reasoned as if there had been an implicit adoption of the essential 
facilities  doctrine  and  as  if  the  aforementioned  decisions,  particularly  Magill,  imply  an 
unambiguous formula. For that reason it simply checked that the conditions listed by the ECJ 
were met. Because it found that IMS had a dominant position in the German market, that its 
refusal was unjustified, that the refusal eliminated competition and that there was no actual or 
potential substitute to the IMS structure, it made an order to license.  
By contrast the CFI emphasized that the circumstances of Magill were exceptional. It 
argued  that  the  facts  in  Magill  and  IMS  were  different.  The  judge  advocated  that  "the 
applicant has made out a provisional prima facie case that the Commission has misconstrued 
the scope of the principles set out in Magill" (24 in Case T-184/01 R).  
According to Derclaye (2003), the judgment suggests that there are two interpretations 
of the Magill case: the cumulative and the alternative interpretation. Under the cumulative 
interpretation the Commission failed to apply the first condition set in Magill, namely that the 
refusal to license prevented the appearance of a new product which the IPR holder did not 
offer and for which there was a potential demand. Since such condition was not apparent in 
the  IMS  case,  the  CFI  suspended  the  decision  of  the  Commission.  Under  the  alternative 
interpretation, blocking access in order to weaken competition would have been sufficient to 




After the complaint made by Sun Microsystems (1998) that its rival Microsoft does 
not disclose information on technical interfaces to Windows NT that is necessary to allow 
competition in the market for server operating system, the European Commission expanded 
its  investigation  in  2002  on  how  streaming  media  technology  (Media  Player)  has  been 
integrated into Windows.  The European case against Microsoft involves thus two issues, both 
related to potential abuses of a dominant position, one about the access restriction on the 
interface between Windows PC and non-Microsoft work group servers and the other one 
related to tying Windows Media player with the dominant Windows operating system. In 
2003,  the  European  Commission  announced  a  preliminary  injunctive  decision  to  require 
Microsoft to provide greater technical information to its server competitors and to reduce the 
ties between its operating system and Media Player. After the collapse of the settlement talks 
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between the European Commission and Microsoft in 2003, the Commission issued a decision 
(24 March 2004) ruling that the company abused twice its market dominance. As regards 
interoperability, Microsoft was required not later than 4 months after the decision to disclose 
complete and accurate interface information which would allow non-Microsoft work group 
servers to achieve full compatibility with Windows PCs and servers. Moreover, the disclosed 
information had to be updated each time Microsoft brings to the market new versions of its 
products. As regards tying, Microsoft was required in a delay of 3 months to offer to PC 
manufacturers  a  version  of  its  Windows  PC  operating  system  without  Media  Player. 
According to the Commission, the effect this remedy would allow the bundle configuration to 
reflect what consumers want and not what Microsoft imposes. Finally, Microsoft has been 
fined 497 million euros for abusing its market power in the EU.   
Microsoft applied for interim measures, requesting from the CFI a suspension of the 
measure  on  the  grounds  that  it  would  make  irreparable  damage.  The  CFI  dismissed  the 
application for interim measures
49.  
We  focus  here  on  the  disclosure  order.  T he  technical  documentation   allowing 
interoperability does not concern  the Windows source code, as it  is not necessary for the 
development of interoperable products.  It concerns only the specifications of the interface 
between the Windows PC operating system and the non -Microsoft work group servers
50. 
Whether these specifications are covered or not by IP is a complex and technical issue.  Even 
if it does not rule out the possibility that these specifications may be covered by copyright, the 
Commission maintains that their implementation by others does not co nstitute a breach of 
copyright since they lead to clearly distinct works ( point 168 in the CFI Order). If th ese 
specicatons were protected by patents, the issue would likely be different. What would happen 
if these specifications were protected only by trade secrecy law?  The  argument of the 
Commission is not completely convincing:  “The Commission acknowledges that Directive 
91/250  does  not  require  the  inventor  to  disclose  the  information  on  his  own  initiative. 
However,  from  the  aspect  of  any  trade  secret  that  Microsoft  may  have,  disclosing 
interoperability  information  is  not  comparable  to  licensing  a  competitor  to  copy  a  work 
protected by intellectual property legislations. That assertion is supported by the technical 
relevance  of  such  disclosure,  by  the  practices  existing  in  the  software  industry  and  by 
Microsoft’s own behaviour when it entered in the market” (point 183 in the CFI order).   
                                                 
49 Order of the President of the CFI, 22 December 2004, available at http://www.europa.eu.int 
50 A group server operating system runs on central network computers that provide services to office workers 
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  At this stage, it is difficult to draw a definite conclusion from the Microsoft case 
except the very general one that the evolution of technology raises new and complex issues at 
the interface of IP and competition law. It could be interesting to develop some guidelines 
clarifying  the  exceptional  circumstances  under  which  access  would  be  mandatory.  For 
instance,  it  could  be  helpful  to  state  that  non  access  is  acceptable  except  when  all  the 
following conditions hold:  i) access is indispensable for providing a product on a secondary 
market, ii) there is an objective potential demand for the would-be product and iii) there are 
no objective justifications for the refusal. But even if these conditions are met, other questions 
remain  open.  For  instance  what  would  be  the  reasonable  price  for  the  licensing  of  the 
disclosed information if access and interoperability were made compulsory?  
To conclude this section, we would like to emphasize that the treatment of refusal to 
license essential intellectual property rights is a very important question in the framework of 
cumulative innovation, particularly in ICT and biotechnology
51 The cumulative character of 
successive  innovations,  in  which  improvements  and  applicati ons  derive  f rom  previous 
inventions, raises concerns that intellectual property rights may create difficulties for follow-
up inventions. But, rather than compelling intellectual property holders to license their right 
when it is essential, another suggested way is to develop bilateral or multilateral agreements 
such as cross-licensing, grant backs, patent pools and collective management of intellectual 
property rights. We turn now to this last issue.  
         
3.  Collective management of intellectual property rights 
 
Collective management of rights allows authors to overcome the transaction cost hurdle that 
impedes the individual exercise of rights granted to them under copyright law. Copyright 
collectives - also called collection societies - emerged to manage rights in works that have a 
great number of potential users but where the value of a single work to the individual user is 
small.  In  such  situations,  management  of  rights  by  individual  rights'  holders  is  not 
economically justified. Under individual management, the costs of negotiating with users, 
collecting payments, identifying those who infringe and suing them would exceed the amount 
the right-holder could expect to collect. Collective administration of copyright addresses the 
problem by spreading the costs over a great many works.  
Under  collective  management,  individual  right-holders  assign  their  right(s)  to  an 
organization which carries out the following tasks on their behalf: it monitors the use of works 
                                                 







































7  24 
in its repertory and takes legal action against those who infringe copyright in these works; it 
negotiates fees with users and collects payments; it distributes payments to its members after 
deduction of overhead.
52   
The oldest and largest collectives manage public performance rights  for music in a 
repertoire that contains millions of works.  These license music users such as broadcasters, 
restaurants, concert halls and sports arenas .
53 The typical license granted by a performing 
rights society is a blanket license.  Such a license gives the licensee the right to unlimited use 
of all the works in the repertoire managed by the collective for a period of one year. 
Typically, the licensing fee correlates with  the scale of users’ operations and the importance 
of  music  to  their  activities.
54  The amounts that are r edistributed by the collective to its 
members depend on the amount of use of their music, and on whether that music played a 
central or ancillary role for the purposes it was used.      
By tradition collectives are active only in the territory of the count ry where they are 
located. However, within that territory they administer a worldwide repertoire made up of 
works entrusted to them by local authors, and works assigned to them under reciprocal 
representation agreements with foreign collectives. This arran gement allows local users to 
obtain via the collective in their national territory  an (delete) unlimited access to a (virtual) 
worldwide repertory of copyrighted music. Such a right to use (delete) is important to music 
users who need unlimited and unplann ed access to a large repertory. The blanket license 
offers such users the guarantee that any music performed in public will not infringe copyright. 
Although public performance often requires that complementary rights be cleared, 
collectives rarely provide users a one-stop-shop. For example, a broadcaster may have to copy 
songs on hard disk in order to perform them in public. This means that the right to reproduce 
the work must also be cleared. For such a user a collective becomes a one-stop-shop only if it 
administers the public performing right, the reproduction right, and the remaining copyrights 
and neighbouring rights that must be cleared to perform the music.
55    
In almost all countries a single society manages the performing right s. Users  who 
need spur-of-the-moment access to a very large repertoire, cannot circumvent the national 
society when: 1) it holds the exclusive license to manage the performing right s in all present 
                                                 
52 Members repossess their rights when they leave the society. 
53 The right to perform a work of music in public is one among several exclusive rights that copyright law grants 
composers.  
54 The tariff base often equals the revenues earned by the user during a representative period; the tariff rate is 
lower for sports arenas where music plays a lesser role than for concert halls where its role is central.  
55 The rights that must be cleared to broadcast a piece of music are those in the musical work ( mostly held by 
composer and publishers) and copyright and/or neighbouring rights in the sound recording (held by performers 
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and future works of its members; and 2) when a substantial portion of authors who produce 
the type of work required by the user are members. As a rule, performing right societies are 
assigned exclusive rights by their members.
56  
Interestingly, the presence of two or more performing right societies within the same 
single territory does not give rise to rivalry in the conventional sense unless the repertoire 
controlled by each have a considerable degree of overlap.
57 The reason is that users may need 
access to the repertoire of both societies to ensure there is no infringement. 
The role of collectives in copyright management has been expanding. Collectives are 
active in areas such as synchronization, reproduction, droit de suite (translate), neighbouring 
rights, (delete comma) and public lending.
58 More often than not, one society is respo nsible 
for the collective administration of a specific right for a particular class of works.
59  
This section will deal almost exclusively with performing rights societies  in music 
because they are the oldest societies and  they have been the subject of most of the (delete) 
antitrust scrutiny.  
 
3.1 Competition issues 
 
The forms of conduct that have come under scrutiny on both sides of the Atlantic are usefully 
grouped under the following headings: actions that strengthen the collectives’ capacity to 
exploit  existing  market  power  vis-à-vis  users;  actions  designed  to  strengthen  or  preserve 
market power vis-à-vis users (repeats above?); and actions designed to favour some members 
at the expense of other members. We will discuss how European competition authorities have 
addressed some of the issues in what follows.
60 
 
Blanket licenses versus limited repertory licensing 
 
The question whether collectives abuse their position of dominance when they refuse to grant 
licenses for a portion of their repertory was addressed by the European Court of Justice in the 
Tournier  Judgment.  Years  before,  the  claimants  -  a  group  of  discotheque  owners  -  had 
                                                 
56 The most notable exception to this arrangement is found in the United States where the two main societies 
(ASCAP and BMI) are bound under the terms of consent agreements to accept only non-exclusive licenses. 
57 In the US there are two major performing right s ocieties (ASCAP and BMI) and one minor one (SESAC)  
(delete as repetitive) 
58 A review of various types of collective administration can be found in WIPO (1990) and Gervais (2001). 
59 For example, there may be two societies that manage reproduction where one  will deal with the reproduction 
of musical works while the other specializes in the reproduction of literary works. 
60 To address the concerns of monopoly power, some countries, including the UK and Canada, have adopted 
systems of compulsory licenses or reg ulation of tariffs by specialized administrative tribunals. Other countries 
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initiated  a  case  before  the  French  competition  authority,  arguing  that  the  SACEM  –  the 
French performing rights society - was acting abusively by refusing them licenses limited to 
popular dance music of predominantly Anglo-American origin. The claimants argued that 
they should not have to pay for the rights in other works that they would never use. They had 
already been refused licenses for such music by the foreign collectives. 
The ECJ (referred to by a French court for a preliminary ruling) held that “the refusal 
by a national society for the management of copyright in musical works to grant the users of 
recorded music access only to the foreign repertoire represented by it does not have the object 
of  restricting  competition  in  the  common  market  unless  access  to  part  of  the  protected 
repertoire could entirely safeguard the interest of the authors, composers and publishers of 
music without thereby increasing the costs of managing contracts and monitoring the use of 
protected musical works”.
61 The apparent implication is that a refusal to issue only blanket 
licenses would be illegal if collectives could somehow fully uphold authors’ interests without 
incurring cost increases.    
The economic rationale behind a demand for partial repertory licenses is not clear. The 
royalties paid to collectives do - in principle at least -  reflect the value of the music to users. 
The mere fact that an individual uses a small subset of a repertoire does not imply that the 
music he uses is less valuable to him. To some users (e.g. discotheques) the music is vital. 
One must assume that the demands for limited repertory licenses derive from a belief that 
some regulatory authority would have (delete) enforce a form of price control under which the 
royalty for a limited repertory license would relate to the royalty charged for a blanket license 
in a way that reflects the difference in the number of works cleared. 
Also, there is little doubt that making limited repertory licensing available is costly.  
One  cost  component  is  that  of  allocating  works  to  different  classes.  This  cost  cannot  be 
recovered if it turns out ex post that there are no takers for a limited repertory.
62 Also, because 
a substantial portion of a collective’s repertory consists of new songs, users who acquire a 
limited license would have to verify on a continuous basis whether new releases they want to 
play are in fact covered by their license. In addition, monitoring costs are higher because 
                                                 
61 Ministère Public versus Jean-Louis Tournier, case 395/87, 13 July 1989.  
62 In this regard it is noteworthy that expert testimony submitted in a US court that dealt with a similar complaint 
indicated that a specific song could be allocated to more than one class and that classification would depend on 
whether the criterion for classification is the type of music or the style of performance. Broadcast Music  Moor –
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societies want to insure that users do not perform works for which they have not cleared the 
rights.
63  
Because of the extra cost associated with fractional licensing, and because the product 
being licensed is a public good, it is likely that the parties would settle on a blanket license 
even if the collective was bound to issue a limited repertory license on demand. One can 
presume  that  users  who  demand  licenses  for  part  of  the  repertory  do  so  in  the  hope  of 
lowering the payment for the blanket licenses. Such hope can only be based on the belief that 
a competition authority or other regulatory body would order a substantially lower tariff for 
the partial license. (Point already made)        
 
The assignment of rights to collectives  
The questions often raised by competition authorities concerning collective societies 
are: 
1. Does a society act abusively when it accepts to administer a specific right only on 
condition that the right holder hand over other rights pertaining to the same works? 
2. Does a society lessen competition unduly when it declines to administer a specific 
right on behalf of a person who refuses to assign that right in respect to all possible uses or 
users of a work?  
3. Does a collective abuse its position of dominance when it demands that rights be 
assigned in a form that rules out direct and independent licensing by members with respect to 
the same rights? 
4. Does a society unduly restrict competition when it accepts members on condition 
that the rights they assign embrace all the works in which they hold such rights?   
Questions 1, 2 and 4 address the issue whether the requirements imposed by a society 
have the effect of drawing under the umbrella of collective management activities that could 
be carried out on an individual and presumably competitive basis.
64 Question 3 addresses the 
issue whether a demand for exclusivity goes beyond the minimum requirement for effective 
management.   
The following principles were laid down by the European Commission in the GEMA 
decision:
65  members of collectives must have the right to choose which  rights, among a 
number of rights or utilisation categories established by the Commission, they wish to exploit 
                                                 
63 A further concern is that different societies may classify works differently. 
64 Or more efficiently by another collective. 
65 GEMA (Geselschaft für Musikalische Auffuerungs und Mechanische Verfi elfaetigungsrechte) is the German 
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through the collective; a collective may demand that a member assign a specific right to all 
works within the categories that it administers.
66  
The Commission considered the issue of partial assignment again when two members 
of Daft Punk (a French techno-music group) applied for membership in SACEM
67 in respect 
of all their rights except two categories identified in the GEMA decision. They were advised 
by the French society that membership would be denied unless they showed that another 
society had been appointed in respect of the excluded rights. In response to a  finding by the 
Commission that such a requirement was abusive of SACEM’s dominant position, the French 
society amended the internal regulation that barred membership of authors who reside in the 
European Union and do not assign all rights to it or to (delete) another society. Under the 
amended rule, SACEM may derogate from this regulation and accept the author. The decision 
to do so must be well-founded. This was accepted by the Commission, which stressed that 
refusals to derogate would have to be exceptional and based on objective reasons.
68   
Neither the GEMA nor the SACEM decision disputed the legality of a collective’s 
demand that a right assigned to (delete) be exclusive. It is significant therefore that some 
jurisdictions  have  expanded  the  list  of  situations  in  which  members  can  withdraw  from 
collective management.  In  Ireland and the UK, performing right  societies  are required to 
allow  members  to  divide  the  performing  right  into  categories  and  decide  which  of  the 
categories they entrust to the collective administration system. Upon request from a member, 
the local societies are duty-bound to license back, on a non-exclusive basis, all or part of the 
performing right in members’ works performed in live concerts - the so-called “live event 
right”  -  by  the  members.  This  arrangement  allows  members  to  negotiate  a  performance 
royalty at the time they settle on other contractual terms with promoters of concerts or owners 
of  venues.  The  reason  given  by  the  UK  Monopolies  and  Mergers  Commission  (give 
reference)  for  recommending  that  members  be  entitled  to  administer  their  own  live 
performances rights is that the circumstances in which this would occur would be tightly and 
clearly defined, and that live performances, such as major tours, were in many respects similar 
to performances of operas and ballets which are classified as grand rights where the articles of 
association permit direct agreement between their copyright holder and the organizer of the 
performance.
69 
                                                 
66 GEMA, EC Official J. L134. June 20, 1971 and GEMAII EC Official J. L 166, July 24, 1972  
67 SACEM is the French performing rights society. (delete as repetition) 
68 Wood (2001) and Bulletin EU 7/8-2002 Competition (24/40). 
69 The UK society had argued unsuccessfully before the competition authority that the absence of mention of 
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Rivalry among collectives 
 
As indicated above, the licenses granted by societies allow for the public performance of 
music within the national boundaries of the territory in which these societies operate. The 
main justification for such territorial limitation is the need for a local presence to monitor the 
uses  of  works  entrusted  to  the  collective.  Such  presence  is  not  necessary  for  on-line 
distribution because specialized software allows monitoring at a distance of all the music 
delivered via a particular server. This makes worldwide management via a single organization 
possible. For that reason it holds the promise of significant cost savings. It also removes a key 
justification for societies not to compete in the cross-border provision of services. To enhance 
the management efficiency of the rights in music delivered via the Internet, a number of 
societies established in different national territories have entered into agreements that allow 
users  such  as  broadcasters  to  clear  rights  for  many  national  territories  via  a  single 
organization.  
The  Commission  has  recently  handed  down  an  important  ruling  in  regard  to 
agreements that cover the rights of performers in music distributed concurrently by broadcast 
and on the Internet. This form of distribution is called simulcasting. 
70 The competition issues 
raised by simulcasting were brought to the Commission ’s attention by an application for a 
negative clearance for an agreement among 29 European and other societies. The agreement 
would have (delete) allowed music users to clear rights for multiple territories and/or pay 
equitable remuneration via a single party.
71 
                                                                                                                                                         
licenses  for  such  uses.  A  similar  argument  did,  however,  carry  weight  with  the  Norwegian  Competition 
Authority  (NCA).  The  NCA  took  action  to  bar  a  local  performing  rights  society  from  claiming  exclusive 
management of its members rights to “ all existing and future rights in respect of all types of use within the fields 
of recording and performance where exclusivity is understood as allow its members an opportunity to manage 
their own works through means other than the society”. (not italic) However, The NCA did not forbid exclusive 
management in the sense that once a work or category is placed under the society’s management, it is managed 
solely by the society. It ordered that room be made for performance and/or recording contracts separate from the 
society. Because the NCA held that the categories listed in the GEMA decisions are no longer relevant in that 
they do not conform “with the possibilities and needs in present day management of rights” it requested that the 
society “propose suitable categories of works and/or forms of use, for its final decision and approval."  See 
Norwegian Competition Authority, Decision V99-33 Re: Revocation of TONO’s dispensation and action against 
TONO’s rule-sections 3-9 and 3-10 of the Act relating to competition. 
70 Case COMP/C2/38.014 IFPI Simulcasting, decision of 8 October 2002, OJ L107 (30.04.2003) p. 58. Another 
(Santiago Agreement) deals with performance license when no simulcasting is involved; see press release 
IP/04/586. A third agreement (Barcelona Agreement) deals with reproduction rights. 
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Under the original agreement a collective could grant a multi-territorial license only to 
simulcasters whose signals originated in its national territory.
72 The licensing fee would have 
been equal to the sum of the individual tariffs set by each society for simulcasting on its own 
territory.
73 Because of concerns expressed by the Commission, the agreement was amended in 
a way that allowed any party that had entered the agreement and was established in the EEA  
to grant a multi-territorial simulcasting license to any broadcaster whose signals originated in 
the EEA.   
This amendment opened a door to some competition among the EEA-based collectives 
that were party to the  agreement. However, price competition remai ned limited because 
aggregation of national tariffs meant that all participating societies would  apparently (delete) 
grant one and the same product at an identical price. The only price-related competition that 
could possibly benefit users related to such  factors as conditions of payment and  eventual 
(what are these?) rebates.   
The Commission opined that this limited price competition was too feeble to benefit 
small or medium scale users. It reasoned that the amalgamation of the royalty and the 
administrative  fee  in  a  single  amount,  as  provided  under  the  original  and  amended 
agreements,  was  not  necessary  to  the  existence  of  an  agreement  and  that  it  “prevents 
prospective users from assessing the efficiency of each one of the participating societies and 
from benefiting from the licensing services from the society capable of providing them at a 
lower cost.”
74 The Commission held that competition would be enhanced if the aggregate 
payments were broken up into separate components: a copyright royalty and an administration 
fee.  
In  response  to  this  concern,  IFPI  submitted  a  second  amendment  that  provided  a 
mechanism under which collecting societies in the EEA would specify which part of their 
tariff corresponds to the administration fee charged to the user. This part would be determined 
with reference to actual administration cost of the individual grantor society. 
With  such  a  split  in  place,  the  Commission  no  longer  opposed  the  principle  of  a 
common  royalty  determined  by  aggregation  of  the  tariffs  established  by  the  individual 
societies. The Commission defended this stance by arguing that this arrangement is the “least 
restrictive of the alternatives in the present circumstances so as to create and distribute a new 
                                                 
72 Under an earlier version of the agreement notified on 16/11/2000 a collecting society was empowered to grant 
a license only to simulcasters whose signals originated in the country traditionally served by that collective.   
73 The latter could be based on a percentage of the revenue generated from the simulcast within its territory. 
74 Commission decision (08.10.2002) relating to a proceeding under Art icle 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 
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product”. It held that in the absence of a “minimum degree of control over licensing terms” 
societies could earn revenue lower than by not participating in an agreement necessary to 
provide a new product to users”. If so, their incentive to participate would disappear.
75 The 
Commission’s decision was also motivated by the fact that the form of co-operation between 
societies  required  under  the  agreement  did  not  replace  existing  competition.  (reduce 
competition below existing levels?) 
  
  Opening up of alternative options.  
 
The effects the amendments will have on welfare will depend on the following: Will they 
allow new actors to license the right managed by the collective? If so, will the presence of 
such actors add significantly to competitive pressure? If both of these conditions are met, how 
will  the  presence  of  additional  actors  affect  welfare?  The  options  that  matter  from  a 
competition perspective are primarily those that allow right holders and users to bypass the 
collective.   
Consider  first  the  option  of  non-exclusive  licenses.  Such  an  option  removes  the 
contractual impediment to direct negotiation between music users and right holders or their 
representatives, in regard to rights managed by collectives. To exert competitive pressure, the 
option must be credible, i.e. it must be attractive to some users and the owners of the music 
they wish to perform. Direct licensing of the right may be appealing to a user who has no need 
for unlimited and unplanned access to a large repertoire of copyrighted works. It may also 
draw users who require such access for a segment of their activities if they can acquire a mini 
blanket  license  for  that  segment  at  a  price  sufficiently  lower  than  the  standard  blanket 
licence.
76A related question is from how many authors such  a user would have to obtain a 
license to satisfy programming requirements not filled by the mini-blanket license.
77 
Transaction costs are also increased by mandating the option. A major component of 
transaction costs is the cost of monitoring music users who do not hold a blanket license. 
Another increase may be  due to the cost of negotiating terms of the performing license. 
However, the latter is likely to be less when the user commissions new music than when he 
seeks to acquire the performing right for an existing work  since when the user commissions 
work from a supplier, the parties are already engaged in dialogue.  
 
                                                 
75 Ibid. para. 111-113. 
76 Such a user could be a broadcaster who uses only pre-recorded music selected (delete). 
77  Also,  interest  in  direct  licensing  would  quickly  wane  if  problems  of  hold-up  arose  because  of  the 
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How much pressure on prices? 
 
The  mere  opening  of  additional  licensing  avenues  does  not  guarantee  that  the  price  of 
performing music will go down. The performing right is only one component of the cost of 
performing  music.  Blanket  licensing  rules  out  price  competition  for  the  performance  of 
components of the repertoire. It does not, however, preclude efforts by right holders to bring 
price strategies into play in order to stimulate the demand for their music. Some users - film 
makers for example - may have to acquire both a performing and a synchronization license. 
As  long  as  the  royalty  paid  to  clear  other  rights  pertaining  to  the  same  works  are  set 
individually, there remains competition for the works. The user of music is concerned about 
the sum of payments for all the rights he must clear. The decomposition of payments into 
performing  royalties  and  other  royalties  hardly  matters.  As  long  as  some  important 
complementary  rights  are  licensed  individually,  an  increase  in  the  price  of  the  blanket 
performing  license  should  be  accompanied  by  some  decrease  in  the  price  of  the 
complementary licenses. 
A similar trade-off may exist in the supply of new works. Producers of TV or radio 
programmes who commission new music pay artists a creative fee. They are also concerned 
with the total cost of the music which includes the creative fee plus all payments to clear the 
rights for all intended uses. Because the creative fees are negotiated on an individual basis, a 
major component of the cost  of music is  determined in  the  market  where  competition  is 
present.  
  The payment of a payola is also a form of price competition. A payola refers to 
payments made to persons in broadcasting to persuade them to give more play time to works 
in which the person making the payment has an interest. Payola exists because  play time 
stimulates the sales of recordings. Some jurisdictions try to proscribe the payment of a payola; 
for example, it is illegal in the US. 
 
4.  Conclusion  
 
This  chapter  has  looked  at  three  areas  where  the  exercise  of  intellectual  property  rights 
granted  appear  to  conflict  with  competition  policy  objectives.  It  has  discussed  major 
judgments handed down by the European courts that clarify how Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty rein in rights to exclude granted under intellectual property laws.  
The  analysis  of  parallel  trade  suggests  that  courts  are  more  likely  to  strike  down 
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the EU market from imports originating from outside the Union. The Trade Marks Directive 
illustrates in the clearest possible fashion the paramountcy of creating a single market as 
policy objective of European competition policy. It is now established that unless explicit 
authorization to sell into the Union is granted, the holder of a European trade mark can block 
such imports. Also, private agreements that pursue this objective are not considered, by their 
very nature, to be anticompetitive. Further evidence of the weight assigned to creating a single 
market is provided by the Commission’s per se treatment of explicit private agreements to 
stop parallel trade among Member States.  
Such  harsh  treatment  of  segmentation  is  difficult  to  justify  on  purely  economic 
grounds. An interesting question, therefore, is whether competition authorities will continue 
to deal in this way with agreements or unilateral conduct that partition the EU into territories 
that do not match national markets (delete). The courts may well face this issue in the near 
future  because  existence  of  a  significant  gap  in  purchasing  power  between  old  and  new 
Member States raises the benefits from geographical segmentation.  
The judgements that address refusals to license know-how, or products protected by 
patents and copyright, do not provide as lucid a picture of the conditions under which a right 
holder will be compelled to issue a license. It is clear that competition objectives do limit the 
scope of the right to exclude granted by intellectual property laws, but the circumstances 
when they do appear to be largely case-specific. The conditions of the much cited Magill 
decision have been termed exceptional. The Oscar Bronner judgment which stresses that the 
cost of developing the essential input is crucial appears well-founded economically. However, 
its impact on future rulings remains uncertain.  
Copyright  collectives  have  always  raised  challenging  questions  from  an  antitrust 
perspective. Blanket licensing and requirements that authors assign all rights or none to the 
collective certainly appear to have anti-competitive potential. Also, the organization of the 
(delete) markets in which collectives operate gives these (delete) collectives a position of 
dominance. Yet, because of the specificities of the markets in which these societies operate, 
they have been allowed to engage in conduct that would otherwise run afoul of competition 
rules. European courts have rightly been concerned that mandating alternative contractual 
arrangements  between  on  the  one  hand,  collectives  and  users,  and  on  the  other  hand, 
collective  organizations  and  their  members,  would  undermine  the  capacity  of  authors  to 
exercise rights granted to them by law. It appears that national courts (authorities?) rather than 
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The trade-off between the desire to promote the emergence of new products and the 
desire to promote competition comes across very clearly in the process that led to adoption of 
the final version of the Simulcast agreement. The Commission finally settled for a formula 
that rules out price competition for the product itself but gives parties to the agreement an 
incentive to minimize overall charges.  
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